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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
All parties to the proceeding in the trial court are identified in the caption on appeal,
except that Janalyn Alder (now known as Janalyn Groscost) was initially named as a
Defendant in the case, but was ordered dismissed prior to trial.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

Nature of the Case

1

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

2

Relevant Statement of Facts

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

6

I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE
REASONABLE VALUE OF THE BENEFIT CONFORMED UPON
DEFENDANT
6

II.

APPLYING THE CORRECT MEASURE OF DAMAGES,
GROSCOST PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON
ALL ASPECTS OF HIS DAMAGES CLAIMS

CONCLUSION

11
12

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bailey-Allen Co., v. Kurzet, 876, P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1994)

1, 6, 8

Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987)

7, 8, 9

First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980)

7

Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1988)

8

DarrellJ. Didericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water & Sewer, 613 P.2d 1116
1119 (Utah 1980)

9

Status and Rules
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(K)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0')

1

Other Authorities
66 Am Jur 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3

ii

6, 11

JURISDICTIONAL
Jurisdiction of this matter in this court, is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(k). Jurisdiction of this matter prior to its transfer from the Utah Supreme Court was
proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
To the extent that Appellee's Issues Presented for Review differ from the Appellant's
issues, the following issue is presented for review:
Did the trial court err in awarding Plaintiff the reasonable value of the benefit
conferred upon Defendant?
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE
REVIEW:
The theories on the applicable measure of damages on Plaintiffs unjust enrichment
claim were argued to the trial court prior to the trial court's ruling. (R. 608, 609, 642 & 643).
The trial court's determination regarding the applicable measure of damages is a question of
law reviewed for correctness by the appellate court. Bailey-Allen Co., v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421,
424 (Utah App. 1994). Moreover, the appellate court may affirm the trial court's decision on
any proper ground. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case
Plaintiff-Appellee Groscost filed an action against Defendant-Appellant Alder for
damages arising out of the construction of a home. Groscost claimed damages under several
theories of recovery, including unjust enrichment. Alder contends he is not obligated to
Groscost in any fashion.
1

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Groscost sued Alder for damages on several legal theories, including unjust
enrichment, arising out of the construction of a home. (R. 60-66). Alder answered the
lawsuit and stated he owed nothing to Groscost and also counter-claimed against Groscost for
improper placement of a lien on the constructed home. (R. 70-75).
All claims and causes of action were tried at a bench trial before the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup, on November 9 and 10, 1994, and December 13, 1994. (R. 151-152). At
the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that there was no meeting of the minds and
therefore, no in law agreement existed between the parties. Accordingly, the trial court
implied an agreement between the parties on the theory of unjust enrichment. The trial
court found that: (1) Groscost had conferred "huge" benefits upon Alder; (2) Alder
acknowledged and appreciated the benefits received from Groscost; and, (3) it would be
unjust for Alder to receive and retain the benefits without paying Groscost for them. (R. 147,
647-648).
The trial court, considering all the evidence and the circumstances, determined the
value of the benefit conferred from Groscost to Alder to be $27,415.00. Then, it reduced that
amount by an off-set for Alder's successful counter-claim, in the sum of $3,954.92, for a final
net award to Groscost of $23,460.08. (R. 151-152 and 650-651).
Alder timely appealed the trial court's decision. (R. 155-155A). On appeal, Alder
contends that the trial court erred by applying the wrong measure of damages to Groscost's
claim for unjust enrichment, and, that under the application of the correct measure of
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damages, Groscost's claim is unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. (Appellants'
Brief at Page 1.)
Relevant Statement of Facts
Robert Alder and Janalyn Groscost, (daughter of Plaintiff-Appellee Groscost) were
married in February 1991. (R.462). At that time, Janalyn was employed at Farm Credit
Bank and Alder was self employed as a real estate appraiser. (R. 474). About nine (9)
months after the couple married, around the end of October or November 1991, they
considered buying a home. (R. 546-550). Beginning in late October or early November,
1991, Alder and Janalyn had some discussions with Janalyn's father, James Groscost, about
Alder and Janalyn's prospects of buying a home. They also discussed the possibility of
building a new home instead of purchasing an existing one. (R. 546-550, 463-465).
James Groscost is involved in the construction industry and is a principal shareholder
and officer in Broken Arrow, Inc., (R. 206-207). During the above mentioned discussions,
Mr. Groscost suggested that Alder and Janalyn consider building a new home; with his
expertise, help and contacts, he could help them cut costs. (R. 208-209). Mr. Groscost
prepared an estimate of costs for a new home for the Alders, having obtained bids from
several subcontractors. (R. 209).
There was no expressed agreement between Mr. Groscost and either or both Alder
and Janalyn concerning the construction project. (R. 590, 647).
Construction on the Alder's home began in or about June 1992, and continued for
over twelve (12) months, and was completed in August of 1993. (R. 384-585).
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In May of 1993, there was a falling out between Alder and Janalyn and it was decided
that they would separate and divorce. (R. 479). At this time the home was still under
construction. (R. 479). About this same time, Alder and Janalyn met with Mr. Groscost to
determine what to do with the home. (R. 480-484). Alder, Janalyn and Mr. Groscost had
several discussions about the house. (R480-484). No agreement was ever reached by the
parties. (R. 647).
Mr. Groscost was involved in the construction from its inception to its termination, in
every facet. (R. 307). Mr. Groscost acted as the general contractor. (R. 482). Much of the
construction work on the house was done by Mr. Groscost's construction company, Broken
Arrow. (R. 592-593). Mr. Groscost, himself, spent a lot of time and effort building the
house. (R. 543). Mr. Groscost was a huge key in the construction of the house. (R. 589).
And, but for the efforts of Mr. Groscost the house would not have been constructed. (R.
592-593). Alder contributed very little to the construction. (R. 587-588, 649).
After construction was completed, the home was eventually sold to a third-party for
$296,000.00. (R. 523). The proceeds from the sale were $116,000.00. Alder does not believe
that the $116,000.00 proceeds are "profit". (R. 524). Alder and Janalyn each received
$58,450.00 from the sale of the house. (R. 649).
After the house sold, there remained amounts due and owing to Mr. Groscost for the
construction. (R. 265). Mr. Groscost tried to resolve the remaining issue of amounts due
and owing to him for the construction with Alder, but Alder would not do anything. (R.
442).
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The case was tried to Judge Rigtrup over three (3) non-consecutive days and at the
end, the trial court concluded as a matter of law from all the evidence that Alder had been
unjustly enriched. (R. 648). The trial court then stated that the measure of damages for
unjust enrichment was the value of the benefit conferred, namely the Defendant's gain, not
the detriment of the Plaintiff or not the value of Plaintiffs services. (R. 648). Accordingly,
the trial court awarded damages to Groscost of $27,415.00 and reduced that amount by a
counter-claim offset to net a final award of $23,460.08. (R. 649-651).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Alder's claim that the trial court applied the wrong measure of damages is, simply put,
not true. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are correct. The trial court
did not err by applying an improper measure of damages, it applied to correct measure.
Alder argues that the trial court awarded Alder's profits to Groscost. This is not true.
The trial court carefully considered all of the evidence, and found: (1) that there was no
contract between the parties; (2) that Groscost had conferred huge benefits on the Alders; (3)
that the Alders knew and appreciated the extent of that benefit; and (4) that under the
circumstances, it would be unjust to allow Alder to retain that benefit conferred without
paying for it. Query: What was the benefit received and retained by Alder? The benefit
received came from the sale of the house, namely $58,450.00. Query: What other benefit did
Alder receive from Groscost besides the direct proceeds from the sale of the house? None
other. The trial court correctly determined that the benefit conferred, was Defendant's gain.
The trial court then correctly determined that the value of the benefit was Defendant's gain
and that a portion of such gain was due and owing from Alder to Groscost.
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In addition, the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the trial court's
award. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that an improper measure of damages was
utilized by the trial court, the evidence presented supports an award of at least the amount
awarded at trial. In fact, the evidence presented at trial supports an award in excess of the
amount awarded at trial. At trial Alder had every opportunity to challenge, object to, or
contradict Groscost's testimony and evidence, and he failed to do so. As such, the trial court
determined the facts from the evidence and made its award accordingly. The evidence clearly
supports the court's award.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE
REASONABLE VALUE OF THE BENEFIT CONFERRED UPON
DEFENDANT.

Unjust enrichment is used to characterize the result of a failure to make restitution of
benefits received under such circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to
account therefor. 66 Am Jur 2d Restitution And Implied Contracts § 3 at 945. The right of
recovery under unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given
situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has
come to him at the expense of another. Id. at 946.
Recovery on the theory of unjust enrichment presupposes that no enforceable contract
exists. Bailey-Allen Co., v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 1994).
The measure of recovery for unjust enrichment is the value of the actual benefit
realized and retained. 66 Am Jur 2d § 3, Supra, at 973. The value of the actual benefit
realized and retained without an express contract for payment does not depend solely on the
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time expended or the actual labor bestowed. The peculiar situation of property on which
work was done, the attendant risk, and other circumstances may be taken into consideration.
Id.
In 1987, this Court issued its opinion in Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App.
1987). Davies involved an action for unjust enrichment where the parties had orally agreed
that plaintiff would construct four duplexes for defendant. A written contract was proposed
regarding the cost, but was never signed by the parties. The lower court found an agreement
between the parties and accordingly awarded plaintiff damages.
On appeal, this Court found no agreement between the parties and remanded the case
for a determination of damages to be awarded based on unjust enrichment. Id.
Due to some confusion regarding the use and application quantum meruit, this Court
in Davies took the initiative and provided guidance to the lower court and other courts. Id. at
268 and 269. There this Court stated:
Contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract or unjust
enrichment, is one branch of quantum meruit. A quasi-contract
is not a contract at all, but rather is a legal action in restitution.
The elements of a quasi-contract, or a contract implied in law,
are: (1) the defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or
knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3) under
circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to
retain the benefit without paying for it. Id. at 269, (citations
omitted).
Then immediately following this statement of the law this Court declared:
The measure of recovery under quasi-contract, or contract
implied in law, is the value of the benefit conferred on the
defendant (the defendant's gain) and not the detriment incurred
by the plaintiff, see First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687
(Utah 1980) or necessarily the reasonable value of the plaintiffs
services. Id. (Emphasis added.)
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Therefore, the measure of recovery is the value of the benefit conferred. The benefit
conferred is the defendant's gain and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff. Alder
argues that the law only allows a court to award the reasonable value of plaintiffs services.
That is not the correct legal standard. The correct legal standard is the value of the benefit
conferred, namely, the defendant's gain. It is interesting that Alder's discussion of the Davies
case fails to include three critically important words, the defendant's gain. The defendant's
gain specifically describe what is the value of the benefit conferred. Moreover, Davies also
tells us what is not the value of the benefit conferred. The value of the benefit conferred is
not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff. However, that is precisely what Alder would have
this Court believe.
This Court in 1988 reiterated its statement of the law from Davies in Scheller v. Dixie
Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1988), stating:
Recovery under quasi-contract or contract implied in law is
measured by the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant
and not by the detriment incurred by the plaintiff or, necessarily,
the reasonable value of the plaintiffs services. Id. (Citing
Davies).
The Scheller decision tell us again what is not the value of the benefit conferred. It is
not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff or the reasonable value of plaintiffs services. It is
the benefit conferred on the defendant, in other words, the Defendant's gain.
And, most recently, on May 31, 1994, this Court once again reiterated its statement of
the law found in Davies, stating:
The benefit conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiffs
detriment or the reasonable value of its services, is the measure
of recovery. Bailey-Allen, Supra at 425 and 426. (Citing Davies
and Scheller.)
8

The Bailey-Allen case involved facts somewhat similar to this case. There, plaintiff and
defendant entered into a contract for the construction of defendant's home. The parties
signed an agreement, but the agreement was silent regarding remedies in case of breach.
After the project was approximately 10% complete, defendant terminated plaintiffs services,
based on plaintiffs failure to provide proof of insurance. Plaintiff sued defendant on several
theories, including unjust enrichment.
At trial, the lower court concluded that plaintiff could recover under unjust
enrichment and awarded plaintiff damages. On appeal, this Court found that the lower court
findings were not as specific as they should have been and remanded the case for more
specific findings under the Davies standard.
The lower court in calculating its award, looked at the percentage of the work
completed by plaintiff and multiplied that percentage by the total contract price to arrive at
an amount of what value of benefit plaintiff had conferred on defendant. On appeal, this
Court found that the method used by the trial court was not unreasonable, stating:
We also note that the percentage of the work completed, if it
resulted from Bailey-Allen's efforts, is not an unreasonable
measure of the benefits conferred. See Darrell J. Didericksen &
Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water & Sewer, 613 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah
1980)
The trial court in this case utilized a similar method. It found that Alder had
contributed up to 15% of the construction, and that the rest had been contributed by
Groscost. The trial court then awarded Groscost the percentage of his efforts/contribution to
the construction. The result is that the parties received an amount which directly reflects the
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percentage of work contributed by each, or in other words, each is allowed to "reap what they
sow."
Alder's argument infers that if Groscost is allowed this recovery then Alder will not
receive anything. Bear in mind that Alder contributed very little to the construction.
Groscost was a huge key to the construction and, but for Groscost being involved, the house
would not have been built. Alder and Groscost are entitled to the percentage of their
contributions and that is what they received. Alder gains approximately $18,000.00 for not
having done much at all.
When discussions began between Alder, Janalyn and Mr. Groscost, everyone believed
and intended that Alder and Janalyn would live in the house. Under that scenario, the
benefit to be conferred by Groscost would be Alder and Janalyn's new home at a cost to
them of less than what they could buy it for on the open market. However, when Alder and
Janalyn separated and intended to divorce and sell the house, and upon the house's eventual
sale, the benefit conferred by Groscost to Alder was no longer Alder and Janalyn's new home
at a cost to them of less than what they could have purchased the same house for on the
open market. It was the benefit received by Alder, which were the proceeds from the sale of
the home, namely the "defendant's gain".
Alder contends that the courts do not allow recovery of defendant's gain and seems to
stretch that argument illogically to mean that the trial court cannot consider, whatsoever, the
"defendant's gain" in awarding damages. These contentions are in error.
Moreover, Alder also argues that the trial court's measure of recovery is unworkable
from a practical standpoint. Alder attempts to illustrate the error in the trial court's theory of
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damages by posing the following question: What would Groscost have been awarded if the
house sold at a break-even figure or at a loss figure? Alder answers his question: Groscost
would not have been entitled to any recovery. This is not true.
Alder's argument fails to recall the specifics of this case. Recall that this transaction
was not one in the normal course of business. Alder himself testified that this was "not an
arm's length transaction," Alder did not view it as such. However, Alder, now on appeal,
wants to argue that the trial court's theory would not work in an arms length transaction and
therefore, it should not work here. The trial court, in its wisdom, recognized that this was not
a normal business transaction and took that into consideration in making its award. The trial
court's award is the only award contemplated and allowed by law and which makes any sense.
Alder states that owners assume the risk and therefore, they should realize the profit.
That is true in a normal business arrangement. This was not a normal business arrangement.
Query: Who was the owner in this case? From the evidence it appears to be Groscost; he
practically built the entire house; and he practically financed the entire project. And, now
Alder wants Groscost to take nothing and he wants to keep everything for himself. That
result is precisely the type of unjust enrichment the law was meant to prevent and protect
from.
As noted previously, many factors may and should be considered when determining
the value of the benefit conferred. 66 Am Jr. 2d § 3, Supra. The trial court committed no
error in applying the correct measure of damages and awarding Groscost an amount
reflecting the value of the benefit he conferred on Alder.
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n.

APPLYING THE CORRECT MEASURE OF DAMAGES, GROSCOST
PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON ALL ASPECTS OF HIS
DAMAGES CLAIMS

Alder argues that the trial court applied the wrong measure of recovery and that
under the correct measure of recovery, Groscost failed to adduce sufficient evidence in
support of his claims. As discussed above, it is clear that the trial court did not apply the
wrong measure of recovery and in fact, did apply the correct measure. Moreover, under any
measure of recovery for unjust enrichment, Groscost presented sufficient evidence in support
of his claim.
A quick visual review of the trial transcript and trial exhibits shows the voluminous
amounts of testimony and documentary evidence Groscost presented at trial. Moreover, this
same quick visual review, will reveal the want of any testimony or documentary evidence
produced by Alder to contradict Groscost's evidence.
Alder's argument on appeal is nothing more than his closing argument at trial. Alder
again chooses not to introduce evidence or point to evidence at trial which contradicts
Groscost's evidence, but rather continues to argue that what Groscost did was not enough.
Groscost produced and the court admitted, without any objection by Alder,
voluminous documentary evidence in support of his claims; Alder produced very little, if any.
Groscost called four (4) individual witnesses to testify on his behalf. Alder called one (1),
himself. Alder had every opportunity to challenge or object to Groscost's evidence at trial,
but he failed to do so. Alder had every opportunity to present documentary evidence to
contradict Groscost's evidences, but he did not. Alder had every opportunity to introduce
testimony to contradict Groscost's but again he chose not to. Just because Alder did not take
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advantage of his opportunity to try his case, he cannot now come to this court and argue that
Groscost failed to prove his case.
The evidence introduced at trial clearly supports Groscost's claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellee James Groscost respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the trial court's judgment/award on the basis that the trial court applied the correct
measure of damages, in awarding Plaintiff the value of the benefit conferred upon Defendant.
And, the testimony and voluminous documentary evidence sufficiently supports the trial
court's award.
DATED this / V ^ d a y of September, 1995.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Richard R. Neslen
Thomas D. Walk
Attorneys for Appellee James Groscost
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